

**The Sewol Ferry is Not Over
Block the Sewol Ferry Heading to the Blue House at All Costs
Kim Young-han's work journal about the Sewol ferry accident . . . Proof of
coercive regulation**

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"If you stand in a different location, what you see will also be different." What did the sinking of the Sewol Ferry mean to Park Geun-hye's Blue House? There is a record that provides insight to this.

These entries here are from the work journal of the late Kim Young-han, a professor at Daegu University who served as the Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs from June 12, 2014 to January 10, 2015.

He wrote notes for 210 days, starting from two days after his appointment (June 14, 2014) until one day before his resignation (January 9, 2015). There is a total of 194 days on which he wrote at least one sentence in his notes. This is a record of his "work." The president's speech at the congressional meeting and the prosecutor's investigation status reports printed out and attached to his notebook clearly show the nature of this work-related journal.

The time period Mr. Kim served as Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs was from two months after the Sewol Ferry accident (April 16, 2014) to two months after the publication of the "Chung Yoon-hoi documents" by Segye Newspaper (November 28, 2014). His notebook is full of notes about the Sewol Ferry accident. Out of the 194 days of notes, there are at least 97 days of notes related to the sinking of the Sewol Ferry.

The Blue House's position on who is responsible for the Sewol Ferry disaster is evident in the notes written on July 8th, 2014. The contents of the notes are as follows: "Treachery of the captain / crew abandoning the ferry, Coastguard's failure to carry out initial rescue, Byung Eun Yoo's greed (modifying the ferry, overload), report to the Blue House and confusion in the process X (none), government's excuse X (do not make any), and assess the situation properly **(See Figure 1)**." We can see the Blue House and government's intention to escape all responsibility of the accident by putting the family of Byung Eun Yoo in the spotlight.

These notes seem to be the orders of Kim Ki-choon (the Chief of Staff to the president at the time). It was the day after the National Assembly Steering Committee (July 7) asked questions about the Blue House report on the day of the disaster. Furthermore, it was two days before the National Assembly announced the "Special Report on the Special Investigation of Seeking the Truth of the Sewol Ferry Sinking (July 10)."

In the notes of Mr. Kim's journal, the Blue House's response plan to the Sewol Ferry incident was to create a monster out of Mr. Byung Eun Yoo, the former Chairman of the Semo Group. By doing so, they would bury the voices of citizens questioning the Blue House and government's responsibility. They also muted the voice of the families of the victims.

The legislators, auditors and investigators were regulated and managed in advance to prevent the fact-finding inquiries to head towards the Blue House and the government. The complete secrecy surrounding the seven hours of President Park's whereabouts on the day of the accident indicates that they would not want to leave to chance anything being exposed. After organizing and analyzing the contents of the journal, the main contents can be divided into five different categories.

1. Catch Byung Eun Yoo

In Mr. Kim's work journal, the former Semo Group Chairman Byung Eun Yoo is mentioned at least more than 26 times during an eight-month period. The Blue House identified and concluded that the cause of the Sewol Ferry disaster was due to overloading and remodeling of the ferry, Byung Eun Yoo's family was designated as the main culprit that needed to be punished. Byung Eun Yoo, the former Chairman of Semo Group — which is the predecessor company of Chonghaejin Marine, the ferry operating company — was made into a symbol of "greed" and "corruption" by the government and media. And the Blue House closely managed the investigation related to the Byung Eun Yoo family.

News articles related to Mr. Yoo started to surface the very next day after the accident on April 17th, 2014. A couple days later, the prosecutor placed a travel ban on Byung Eun Yoo's family and began a large-scale investigation. The allegations included property concealment, tax evasion, embezzlement, and unlawfully dispersing assets abroad. The prosecutors placed Byung Eun Yoo and his son Yoo Dae-kyoon on the most wanted list on May 22nd. Rewards placed for their arrest were set at 500 million won [about \$436,405] and 100 million won [about \$87,281], respectively.

The government intervened as well. On June 13th, the Ministry of Security and Public Administration temporarily held nationwide meetings in an effort to capture the Byung Eun Yoo family members. They orchestrated a nationwide mission to catch Byung Eun Yoo. On June 19th, there was a news report stating that classified internal investigative documents were leaked to the Salvationist Group (Evangelical Baptist Church) of which Mr. Yoo was a member. The news report stated that the prosecutor's internal documents came into the hands of the Salvationist Group when there was a search and arrest operation executed by the prosecutors a month earlier at the main meeting place (Geumsoowon) of the Evangelical Baptist Church in Anseong.

One day later (June 20th), in the work journal of Mr. Kim, it lists the following items: “public distrust problem, information leak/paper, punishment, warrant execution process - compromise with criminals X (none) **(See Figure 2)**.” The notes indicate an emphasis on an uncompromising and thorough investigation of the Yoo family. The use of the Chinese character (“chief”) indicates that he was taking notes of the orders from the former Chief of Staff Kim Ki-choon.

Soon after, however, Yoo was found dead. The police confirmed that the body they discovered in a plum field in Suncheon, Jeollanam-do was Yoo. The police announced this on July 21st. Although this “evil giant” was found dead, the Blue House continued to closely monitor each step of the tracking of the property of Byung Eun Yoo’s family.

In the work notes of Mr. Kim on October 7th, it says, “First arrest Kim Hye-kyung – negotiate -leniency process **(See Figure 3)**.” It is marked that the former Chief of Staff Kim Ki-choon issued this order as well. Kim Hye-kyung, the head of the Korean Pharmaceutical Company, was called the “safe keeper” of Mr. Yoo. Just four months before, Former Chief of Staff Kim had ordered “no compromise with criminals” and we can see here that he is ordering the prosecution to catch the “safe keeper” of the “evil giant” and negotiate leniency.

The goal seems to be to trace the hidden assets of Byung Eun Yoo’s family. If they were to find the hidden wealth of Yoo’s family, it would have been an opportunity for the Blue House and the government to reveal the family’s “greed” and announce the success of the government and investigative team. The prosecutors received custody of Kim Hye-kyung from US authorities.

2. Divide the Victims’ Families

In the journal of Mr. Kim, he describes the families of the victims of the Sewol Ferry accident as “excessively and unreasonably” demanding (Notes from June 16, 2014). The Blue House was opposed to the idea of the victims’ families request for an unlimited investigation to find the truth and said that salvaging the ferry to find the missing people was a burden on the Blue House and the government.

In the notes of Mr. Kim on August 22nd, it says, “Sewol Ferry family members (students’ families) and other families demand moderation; apply their demand and neutralize **(See Figure 4)**.” This too has the symbol indicating Kim Ki-choon, Chief of Staff.

The families of the victims group were divided into two main groups at the time. There was the “Sewol Tragedy Victims/Missing/Survivors’ Family Committee” (Sewol Family Committee) and the “Sewol Tragedy General Victims’ Family Committee” (General Victims Committee). The two groups had very different views regarding the Special Sewol Law that was agreed on and passed by the ruling and opposition parties on August 19th. The Sewol Family Committee opposed the agreement that did not give the fact-finding committee (hereinafter “Sewol Special Investigation Committee”) the right to investigate

and indict. The General Victims Committee agreed with the joint proposal by the ruling and opposing parties and requested prompt enactment.

The contents of the notes on August 22nd appear to be an order from Former Chief of Staff Kim Ki-choon to push forward with the General Victims Committees' position, which was aligned with that of the government and Blue House. Instead of opting for a thorough investigation, they devised a way to not put pressure on the Blue House and the government.

In the following month, the Blue House heavily focused on the incident involving Kim Hyun, the congressman for the New Political Democratic Union at the time, beating up a driver. On September 17th, Congressman Kim Hyun and the Sewol Family Committee were involved in scandals involving the assault of the driver and incitement of violence. Mr. Kim's notes on this day lists, "Congressman Kim Hyun, beating / Sewol Ferry family uprising (**See Figure 5**).” And from September 19th to the 21st, there are notes about “charge to southern district prosecutors,” “strictly monitor,” and “to work promptly (**See Figure 6**).”

It was written in his work-related notes that the Blue House encouraged and caused the incident of the opposition congressman and the incitement of violence investigation of the family members of the victims of the Sewol Ferry to become an issue. The ruling party demanded Kim Hyun's resignation from the National Assembly's Security Administration Committee right before the following month's (October) audit of the National Assembly. On September 19th, a group called the “Free Youth Union” pressed charges against Kim Hyun and the leaders of the Sewol Family Committee at the Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office.

The Blue House was opposed to salvaging the Sewol Ferry to recover the missing bodies. In Kim's notes dated October 27th, it says, “salvaging the Sewol Ferry - salvage bodies X, responsibility of government, burden (**See Figure 7**).” The symbol indicating that Former Chief of Staff Kim Ki-choon issued this order is also marked in the notes.

At that time, there were 10 people missing from the Sewol Ferry accident. If you analyze the notes, it seems to mean that “salvaging the missing people” was not possible because it would be holding the government responsible and would cause a burden to the government. This day was the day for the nine families of the Sewol Tragedy Missing Family Committee (10 missing people) to vote and decide whether to oppose salvaging the hull and whether to continue searching the hull of the ferry. On the next day, October 28th, 102 days since the accident, a missing person was discovered.

3. Stop the Special Sewol Law

In July, 2014, the ruling and opposition parties failed to reach an agreement on the Special Sewol Law. The surviving family members of the accident and the National Countermeasures Committee of the Sewol Ferry Accident demanded a fact-finding committee with the right to investigate and indict without any limitations.

The Blue House closed its ears to this demand. In the notes of Mr. Kim dated July 20th, it says, “although prosecutors are arresting people involved in the Sewol ferry incident, detaining people, and carrying out thorough investigations, the victims’ family members demand the right to investigate.” “Convince citizens by updating details about the progress, direction, and determination” **(See Figure 8)**.” It can be interpreted that they were trying to discredit the victims’ families for an unlimited investigation to find the truth by “advertising” the prosecutor’s investigative efforts.

The Blue House viewed the Special Sewol Law as a “dangerous” law that would bring about a “national crisis” **(See Figure 9)**. The Blue House found it necessary to block the Special Sewol Law proposed by the victims' families and the opposition party, which would include giving investigative and indictment rights to the fact-finding committee.

The victims’ families requested that a “proper” Special Sewol Law be enacted, and they started a hunger strike in front of the Congressional building on July 14th. Mr. Kim Young-oh, one of the surviving family members of the victims of the Sewol Ferry accident, fasted for 46 days until August 28th. In Mr. Kim’s notes on August 23rd, it says, “suicidal fasting (harming the body), fasting should be deterred, encourage X; instruct media to arouse public criticism. Each Δ. (See Figure 10)” There is a mark indicating that it is an order from the former Chief of Staff Kim Ki-choon. The note means that the media should be coached to heavily criticize Mr. Kim’s (the surviving family member) fasting.

In Kim’s notes on August 29th, there are detailed notes by one of the employees of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) on keeping an eye on Kim Young-oh **(See Figure 11)**. The notes show that the NIS employee asked about the health conditions of Mr. Kim at the hospital he was admitted to and asked about his family relationships and education at Mr. Kim’s hometown town hall in Jungeup, Jeonbuk. Even so, the NIS completely denied all speculations about their surveillance on Kim Young-oh. Although the Blue House had direct knowledge about the illegal spying done by the NIS on one of the surviving family members of the Sewol Ferry accident, they did not take any official action. At the time, the Blue House seemed only focused on discrediting the surviving family members’ “unreasonable” demands and passing the Special Sewol Law in accordance with the position of the ruling party. And that is what actually happened.

On August 7th, the ruling and opposition parties reached an agreement on the Special Sewol Law. The opposition party made two concessions.

The fact-finding committee would keep the right to investigate and indict, but in exchange, they had to limit their position to only being able to recommend a special prosecutor; but they had to give up that concession as well. It was ultimately decided that both the ruling party and the opposition party had to agree on the nominations of the candidates for the special prosecutor.

Even before the enactment of the Special Sewol Law, the Blue House managed attorneys

that would be recommended to the Special Prosecutor Candidate Recommendation Committee and they ordered to seek out special prosecutor candidates who would act favorably for the ruling party.

In Mr. Kim's notes on August 4th, it says, "Special Prosecutor Candidate Recommendation Committee (7 people - ruling/opposition party 4 people) - after preparing a list of people with 15 to 20 years of prosecutorial experience and coordinate as needed - prepare in advance" (**See Figure 12**). On August 8th, his note says, "Prepare a list of sound special prosecutor candidates. Pool. Keep a list of attorneys handy. Arrange meetings. Input in Commission" (**See Figure 13**). And next to this note is Former Chief of Staff Kim Ki-choon's mark indicating that it was his order.

Finally, the Special Law, the "Special Act for Learning the Truth of the Sewol Tragedy and Building a Safe Society" was passed by Congress on November 7th. This was 205 days after the accident. The Blue House took charge of managing the Sewol Ferry Accident Special Investigation Committee that was formed in accordance to the Sewol Special Law.

In Mr. Kim's notes on November 28th, it says, "(1) Prosecution investigation, (2) Sewol fact-finding investigation committee 17 people-assistant commissioner and secretary general, (prefer aspiring politician) * Syegye News Corp. attack plan * (2) Seok Dong-hyun (1) Jo Dae-hwan" (**See Figure 14**). The Blue House seemed to bring up attorneys Jo Dae-hwan and Seok Dong-hyun as the people that the ruling party would nominate for the Sewol Special Investigation Committee. The expression "prefer aspiring politician" appears to mean that the Blue House assessed that someone who is easily manageable would have to be nominated. In December of 2014, Attorney Jo Dae-hwan became the vice chair and executive director of the Sewol Special Investigation Committee based on the recommendation of the Saenuri Party.

4. Manage the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea and Prosecutors

Before the Special Sewol Law was enacted, the governmental departments that headed the investigation to identify the cause of the Sewol Ferry accident were the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea and the Prosecutors' Office. The Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea carried out their audit from May to June 2014 and announced their final results on October 10th. The prosecutors launched an investigation immediately after the accident and announced their final results on October 6th. However, although the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea and prosecutors are constitutionally independent entities, the Blue House intervened in the announcement of the investigation results.

In Mr. Kim's notes on September 1st, it says, "chief auditor report - make it off the record" **(See Figure 15)**. On September 16th, it says, "Sewol Ferry auditor audit results- announce everyone rescued—>time of auditor's announcement" **(See Figure 16)**. The Blue House coordinated the timing and content of the auditor's announcement in advance.

It was revealed that the Blue House had already looked at the draft of the auditor's investigation report before the auditor's final results were announced. In Mr. Kim's notes on October 2nd, it says, "first response-fire etc. 48 people. Safety inspection 10 people safety operations - 16 people. Disaster response organization 20, total 94 people (27 people) Coastguards, chief, deputy director, West Sea commissioner, security director, Incheon port chief 2 people, marine officer, ministry of land, transport and logistics" **(See Figure 17)**. This note was written 8 days before the auditor announced its final result.

The categories for those needing to be disciplined listed in the notes are similar to the auditor's categories such as "first response," "ship intake/inspection," "safety operation manager," and "disaster response system." The audit office announced an interim report earlier on July 8th, but there was no mention about those who would need to be disciplined. One can suspect that the Blue House received an early draft of the final report of the audit office. The Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea's final list of people requiring disciplinary action was a total of 50 people.

It is less than the number of people (94 people) listed in the notes.

There was evidence of the Blue House receiving the announcement of the auditor's final results and requesting to edit and change the content. In Mr. Kim's notes on October 8th, it says, "results of audit-get in advance to review, comment" **(See Figure 18)**. Two days later on October 10th, there were plans to receive the audit office's final report in advance to change and edit.

The prosecutors were no exception. On October 3rd, three days before the prosecutors' announcement of the results of the "Sewol Ferry Accident Investigation," there is evidence that the Blue House tried to question the content of the prosecutor's investigation report. In Kim's notes on October 3rd, it says, "announcement (10/6)-first response lacking (government)—>specific terms" **(See Figure 19)**. It seems that they received the prosecutors' investigation report announcement in advance and tried to challenge the parts described as "the government's mistakes and responsibilities."

Former Chief of Staff Kim Ki-choon and the Blue House continued to intervene with the investigation result reports of the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea and the Prosecutors' Office. In Mr. Kim's notes on October 13th, there is the mark indicating that it was Former Chief of Staff Kim Ki-choon's orders and it says, "Before the audit-pro- investigate result announcement review the contents and adjust the wording—>note, prosecutor, auditor" **(See Figure 20)**.

5. Protect “The Seven Hours”

The Blue House, at the time, consistently turned a blind eye to the National Assembly’s demand for details on what President Park Geun-hye was doing on the day of the accident. It was clear that they would not give the victims’ families any chance to form “a fact-finding committee that has the right to investigate and indict” and they would avoid any possibility that the Blue House and government would be held responsible for the accident.

In Mr. Kim’s notes on July 15th, legal documents supporting the position not to disclose the president’s whereabouts as private are attached in his notebook (**See Figure 21**). Former Chief of Staff Kim Ki-choon issued a guideline on the day of the accident not to disclose the president’s actions. In the notes on July 18th, it says, “4/16 schedule, about location-draft response-head of the state language, protect Δ, coughing rest work at home, location where work is carried out, don’t need or want to know due to security reasons. impossible to provide data” (**See Figure 22**). It was an order to cover the President’s actions on the day of the accident.

The Blue House was being questioned by the National Assembly Steering Committee (July 7th) and the National Assembly’s Special Committee for Investigating the Sewol Tragedy about the whereabouts of the President on the day of the accident. In Mr. Kim’s notes on August 9th, it says, “due to the security of the Head of State, the President’s whereabouts cannot be disclosed. private life. inappropriate to raise national security” (**See Figure 23**). An internal policy was set to continue to deflect any questions about President Park’s whereabouts on the day of the accident.

Mr. Kim’s notes start with the Sewol Ferry accident (June 14th) and end with the “Chung Yoon- hoi document” (January 9th). Kim was ordered to attend the National Assembly meeting about the “Chung Yoon-hoi documents” but refused and handed in his resignation. His resignation was accepted the very next day (January 10th).

Two days later, on January 12th, in President Park’s New Year speech about “the Chung Yoon- hoi files” she said, “The public officials who are in a position to be loyal and serve the country, any acts for their personal gain and that crumble the dignity of the country cannot be forgiven.” And so the “election fraud scandal” was shifted to the “document leak scandal,” just as the person responsible for the Sewol Ferry accident became Byung Eun Yoo, and not the government.